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arguably privileged material,56 state legislatures may be spurred into
clarifying the presently uncertain boundaries of third-party searches
under state law.

Criminal

Law-HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED TESTIMONY HELD INADMISSI-

BLE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDING-.ae

. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.

1980).
The admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony was first con-

fronted by the American judicial system in People v. Ebanks,' an 1897
California case. 2 The Ebanks court held that exculpatory statements
made by defendant while under hypnosis were inadmissible, indicating
that hypnosis could not be used to establish a defense to a crime. 3 Following Ebanks and its progeny the issue of hypnotically-induced testimony generally was dormant within the courts 4 until the 1950 North
56. While title I of the Act applies to both federal and state officials, title II, which
deals with third parties that are not associated with the dissemination of information to
the public, applies only to federal employees. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-440, tit. II, § 201, 49 U.S.L.W. 185, 186 (Dec. 9, 1980).
1. 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897). In Ebanks, the defendant sought to call an expert
witness to the stand to testify that the defendant was not guilty based on statements made
to the hypnotist while the defendant was in a hypnotic trance. See id. at 665, 49 P. at 1053.
In an earlier case, the California Supreme Court was presented with the defense of hypnotic suggestion but the court did not discuss the legal admissibility of the defense. See
People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1894).
2. See Note, Hypnotaim andthe Law, 14 VAND. L. REV. 1509, 1519 (1961) (question of
whether statements made during hypnosis could be admitted as evidence was first before
American courts in 1897 case of People v.Ebanks).
In the late 1800's, two European cases were recorded in which hypnotists were
charged with "seduction abetted by hypnosis" and a third case involved not only the
defense that the crime of murder had been induced by hypnosis but also the use of hypnosisas an investigative tool. See Herman, The Use Of Hypno-Induced Statements In Criminal
Cases, 25 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1964). These European cases sparked an immediate interest by the American criminal bar and led to attempts by defense lawyers to use hypnosis to
acquit their clients. See id.at 2. There were a number of early cases involving either the
defense of hypnotic suggestion or the admissibility of statements under hypnosis. See, e.g.,
People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897); People v. Worthington, 105
Cal. 166, 172, 38 P. 689, 691 (1894); Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 512-17, 96 N.Y.S. 814,
815-19 (1906). These early cases tended to involve sexual crimes perpetrated against hypnotized persons. See Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotssm, 11 YALE L.J. 173, 178 (1902).
3. See 117 Cal. at 665, 49 P. at 1053. The California Supreme Court examined the
trial court's finding that "[t]he law of the United States does not recognize hypnotism"
and that, consequently, the offer by defendant of testimony elicited from him while under
hypnosis "would be an illegal defense." Id. The supreme court concluded: "We shall not
stop to argue the point, and only add the court was right." Id.
4. See Herman, supra note 2, at 2. "[F]rom 1894 to 1915, there were a number of
cases involving . . . the admissibility of exculpatory statements made under hypnosis. . . . However, judicial hostility was manifest. . . . [Fjrom 1915 until 1950, there was
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Dakota case of State v. Pusch,5 which heralded a renewed interest by litigants and commentators in the legal aspects of hypnotically-induced testimony. 6 Ausch also held that hypnotically-induced testimony could not
be used to establish a criminal defense. 7 It was not until 1980, however,
that the Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Mack,8 addressed the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony. The Mack court held that
such testimony was inadmissible in a criminal proceeding because the
science of hypnosis had not achieved sufficient acceptance in the scientific community.9 The decision, however, did not foreclose the use of
but one reported case dealing with any medico-legal aspect of hypnosis." Id. (referring to
Louis v. State, 24 Ala. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930)) (footnotes omitted).
In Louis v. State, 24 Ala. 120, 130 So. 904 (1930), the defendant was convicted of
robbery and had allegedly procured money from the victim through hypnosis. See id. at
124-25, 130 So. at 904-05. Under Alabama law, any conviction of robbery must be supported by a finding that the defendant had taken property from the victim either by
violence to her person or by putting her in fear. See id. The Alabama Court of Appeals
found that the record disclosed no violence to the victim's person. Furthermore, the court
held that fear was not an element of hypnosis. See id. at 125, 130 So. at 905. Because
neither of these prerequisites were established by the record, the court overturned the
conviction. See id.
5. 77 N.D. 860, 46 N.W.2d 508 (1950).
6. Following PArch, a number of cases in other jurisdictions and a number of commentators examined the issue of hypnotically-induced testimony. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 59 Cal. 2d 722, 732-33, 382 P.2d 33, 39-40, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 231-32 (1963)
(admission of hypnotically-induced testimony within discretion of court, but court erred in
failing to exercise discretion), ovemruled in part on other grounds, People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d
631, 388 P.2d 33, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 878, 366 P.2d
314, 319,'16 Cal. Rptr. 898, 903-04 (1961) (court did not abuse discretion by disallowing
hypnotically-induced testimony where reliability of hypnosis and qualification of expert
not established); People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 287-88, 338 P.2d 495, 497-98
(1959) (court did not err by permitting expert testimony on effects of hypnosis while disallowing courtroom demonstration of hypnosis); People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 361-62, 98
N.E.2d 553, 557-58 (1951) (issue of involuntary confession because of hypnotic influence is
one of fact within province of jury), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 918 (1953); State v. Harris, 241
Or. 224, 236-42, 405 P.2d 492, 497-500 (1965) (court properly excluded hypnotically-induced, tape-recorded testimony); Levy, Hypnosis andLegatlmmutabih , 46 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 333 (1955); Comment, Hypno-InducedStatements: Safeguardfor Admissibility, 1970 LAw
& SoC. ORD. 99; Note, Hypnotism, Suggestibitit and the Law, 31 NEB. L. REv. 575 (1952);
Note, supra note 2; 11 HAsTINGS LJ. 72 (1959); note 19 inhfa and accompanying text.
7. See State v. Pusch, 77 N.D. 860,886-88, 46 N.W.2d 508, 521-22 (1950). In Pasch,
the defendant was put into a hypnotic trance on several occasions by a trained hypnotist.
The hypnotist was not permitted to testify about the exculpatory statements made by the
defendant or about other statements made by the defendant that tended to show his innocence. See id. at 886-88, 46 N.W.2d at 521-22.
The Pusch court was unaware of Ebanks when it rendered its decision. In concluding
that the hypnotically-induced testimony was inadmissible, the court found that "[n]o case
has been cited by either party relating to the admissibility of the evidence profferred and
no case has been found." See id. at 886, 46 N.W.2d at 522.
8. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
9. See 292 N.W.2d at 768. For a discussion of the reasoning of the court's decision,
see notes 39-49 infla and accompanying text. Arizona also precluded the use of hypnoti-
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hypnosis as an investigative tool. 10
In Mack, hypnosis was used by the Minneapolis police to aid the complainant in remembering the circumstances surrounding a serious injury
that occurred while she was heavily intoxicated.II Under hypnosis,12 the
cally-induced testimony near the time of the Mack decision. See State v. La Mountain, 125
Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980).
While authorities vary on the precise definition of the hypnotic state, the American
Medical Association has defined hypnosis as a "temporary condition of altered attention
in the subject which may be induced by another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontaneously or in response to verbal or other stimuli, these phenomena
include alterations in consciousness and memory and increased susceptibility to suggestion
"Council
..
on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hpnosir, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 188 (1958);
accord, 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA MACROPAEDIA 133 (1974) (hypnosis defined as "a
sleeplike state that nevertheless permits a wide range of behavioral responses to stimulation"). The Encyclopedia article on hypnosis was written by Dr. Orne, who was one of the
experts in the Mack case. See 292 N.W.2d at 766. The Mack court recognized that hypnosis has been "defined as a 'highly suggestible state into which a willing subject is induced
by a skilled therapist'...." See id. at 765 (footnote omitted).
In a recent criminal case, the Minnesota court was faced with an issue similar to the
hypnosis issue in Mack. See State v. Posten, No. 50328 (Minn.), Finance and Commerce,
Jan. 30, 1981, at 6. In Poslen, the court ruled that it was not improper to admit testimony
regarding the complainant's "sleep talk." Id. at 7. The defendant was suspected of sexually molesting the complainant. After the alleged molestations were discovered, the complainant was placed in a foster home. While there she had several bad dreams in which
she uttered the defendant's name and said "stop it, stop it." Id. at 6. The court noted that
this testimony was just one element of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. See id. at 7.
"[Tihe error, if any, was harmless." Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Wahl, the author of the Mack decision, concluded
that such evidence was inadmissible. See id. (Wahl, J., concurring specially). Justice Wahl
indicated that such evidence is inherently unreliable "because its probative value is more
than substantially outweighed by the dangers of prejudice. . . . The same concern about
the unreliability of the evidence which led this court to rule inadmissible statements made
in a pre-trial interview should be controlling in this case." Id. at 7-8 (Wahl, J., concurring
specially) (citing State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980)).
10. See 292 N.W.2d at 771. For a further discussion of the investigatory use of hypnosis, see notes 57-63 infa and accompanying text.
11. See 292 N.W.2d at 766-67. Conflicting and incomplete explanations were given
for the complainant's injury, which consisted of "a cut through the vaginal tissue." See 1d.
at 766. According to defendant, he and complainant "were engaged in sexual intercourse
when she started bleeding." The complainant initially believed that she had been injured
in a motorcycle accident. After being advised by her doctors that her injuries could not
have occurred in the ways described, the complainant contacted the police to report an
assault. She informed the police that she was unable to remember anything about the
cause of her injury. Furthermore, the complainant indicated that she had recently suffered emotional problems because of the termination of a serious relationship with a man
and that "she had 'blacked out' from drinking on other occasions." To help the complainant recall the events surrounding her injury, the police contacted a "self-taught lay hypnotist," Mr. Beauford Kleidon. See id.
One court has held that hypnosis of a witness conducted by law enforcement personnel constitutes an identification proceeding. People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 871-72,
417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (County Ct. 1979). The Hughes court held that a defendant is
entitled to a pretrial hearing to determine whether the procedures used were so impermis-
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complainant recalled being sexually assaulted with a switchblade.' 3 At
the close of the hypnotic session, she was told to remember everything
that occurred on the night of the assault.14 After the hypnotic session,
sibly suggestive that they would give rise to the substantial likelihood of uncorrectable
misidentification. See id. at 872, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The Hughes court held, however,
that the defendant did not have a sixth amendment right to have his counsel present at
the hypnotic sessions. See id.
12. Mr. Kleidon, the complainant's hypnotist, stated that before the hypnotic session
he was aware only that the witness had a memory block regarding the cause of her injury.
See 292 N.W.2d at 767. Two police officers accompanied the complainant to Mr.
Kleidon's office and left for 45 minutes so that Mr. Kleidon could conduct tests and hypnotize the complainant. See id.
During this time, Kleidon tested. . . [the complainant's] hypnotic susceptibility
with several standard tests, induced hypnosis with a standard fixation procedure,
and, when he had determined that she had entered a deep hypnotic state, asked
her permission for [the officers] to enter the room. . . . [The complainant]
agreed, and the policemen entered and made an audio tape recording of the
portion of the hypnotic session which followed. This tape itself has been lost. A
transcript, typed by the police stenographer, was received in evidence as State's
Exhibit C.

Id.
13. See id. During hypnosis, Mr. Kleidon instructed the complainant to "remember
the events of May 13 and May 14 as they actually occurred, but as though on a television
screen and without emotion." See id. Under this hypnotic trance, the complainant recalled the incident. See id.
14. At the close of the session, but while the complainant was still in a hypnotic
trance, Mr. Kleidon gave the complainant the following "post-hypnotic suggestion":
"'You are going to feel as if your body and mind have been completely rejuvenized [sic]
and you will be able to remember very clearly everything that has happened on the 13th
and 14th. Now that memory is very clear in your mind. This does not disturb you.'" See
id. ([sic] in original).
The court believed that a "post-hypnotic suggestion" raised serious constitutional
problems because the ability of the defendant's attorney to effectively cross-examine the
witness would be impaired. See d. at 768-70. The court observed that:
A witness who was unclear about his "story" before the hypnotic session becomes
convinced of the absolute truth of the account he made while under hypnosis.
This conviction is so firm that the ordinary "indicia of reliability" are completely
erased, and hypnotic subjects have been able to pass lie detector tests while attesting to the truth of statements they made under hypnosis which researchers
know to be utterly false. It would be impossible to cross-examine such a witness
in any meaningful way. Such firm subjective conviction as could easily fool a
juror is even more likely to result from a situation where the subject has been
given a post-hypnotic suggestion like the one in this case ....
Id. at 769 (footnotes omitted).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a different view of the admissibility of testimony based on memory refreshed by hypnosis. In United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978) the court stated:
[The defendant] did not object to the adequacy of the foundation laid for the
receipt of the testimony. Rather, he attempted to exclude all in-court testimony
of [the previously hypnotized witness] on the grounds that no testimony from
witnesses who had been hypnotized could be reliable, and that the use of testimony of a witness who had been hypnotized would deny the defendant his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation and his right to call witnesses on his own
behalf. The predicate for both constitutional arguments is that the in-court testimony of a witness who had earlier been subject to hypnosis is unreliable as a
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the complainant gave the Minneapolis Police Department a "typewritten statement recounting as her present memory the events of May 13, as
she reported them under hypnosis."15 Based on this statement, a complaint was issued charging the defendant with criminal sexual conduct in
the first degree and aggravated assault with a dangerous weapon.16
Prior to a hearing on probable cause, the district court certified to the
Minnesota Supreme Court the question of whether a previously hypnotized witness may testify in a criminal proceeding concerning the subject
matter adduced at a pretrial hypnotic interview.17
Since the Pusch and Ebank decisions, hypnosis has achieved recognition
in the medical community as a legitimate method of treatment.1 8 The
medical acceptance of hypnosis may have spurred the recent interest in
matter of law rendering the witness legally incompetent to testify. We rejected
that premise in Kline v.Ford Motor Company, Inc., [523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam)] and we see no reason for a different result in the context of a
criminal case.
581 F.2d at 199.
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in refusing to admit hypnotically-induced testimony,
relied upon the results of lie detector tests. Specifically, the Mack court found persuasive
the ability of hypnotized subjects to pass such tests while clearly attesting to falsehoods.
See 292 N.W.2d at 769. The same court, however, held the results of a lie detector test to
be inadmissible as scientifically unreliable. See, e.g., State v. Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76, 77
(Minn. 1978), noted in 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 455 (1980); State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514,
525, 253 N.W.2d 378, 385 (1977) (per curiam); State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn. 401, 407, 246
N.W.2d 12, 15 (1976).
15. See 292 N.W.2d at 767.
16. See Respondent's Brief'at 13. The statute, under which the defendant was
charged with first degree criminal sexual conduct, states:
A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree and may be
sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 20 years, if he engages in sexual
penetration with another person and if any of the following circumstances exists:
. . .[t]he actor causes personal injury to the complainant, and . . .[t]he actor
uses force or coercion to accomplish sexual penetration ....
See MINN. STAT. § 609.342(e) (1980).
The statute under which defendant was charged with aggravated assault, stated:
"Whoever assaults another with a dangerous weapon but without inflicting great bodily
harm may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a
fine of not more than $5,000, or both." Act of May 17, 1963, ch. 753, art. I, § 609.225(2),
1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1202, as amendedby Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 738, § 1, 1969 Minn.
Laws 1336 (repealed 1979).
17. 292 N.W.2d at 765. The Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a
judge may certify a case to the Minnesota Supreme Court if, in the opinion of the judge, it
presents a question of such important or doubtful character that it requires a decision by
the supreme court. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02(4).
18. See Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187
(1958) (after extensive two-year study, American Medical Association endorsed use of
hypnosis); accord, People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 385-86, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853
(1979) (stating that medical authorities indicate hypnosis is valuable tool which can be
used to restore memory); Spector & Foster, Admirsabilio ofHypnotic Statements: Is the Law of
Evidence Susceptible?, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 568 (1977) (courts cannot retreat from increased recognition and understanding hypnosis has received in medical community).
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seeking the admission of hypnotically-induced testimony in a court proceeding. 19 The result has been a less than uniform treatment of hypnoti2
cally-induced testimony. 0
The question of the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony in
a criminal proceeding generally arises in two contexts. 2 1 The first involves the use of hypnosis by a defendant seeking to prove his innocence, 22 and the second concerns the prosecution's use of hypnosis to
revive the memory of a witness or victim. 23 Generally, courts have held

that a defendant's exculpatory statements made while under hypnosis
are inadmissible. 24 Courts, however, generally have admitted hypnoti19. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1978); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
App. 3d 379, 384-88, 385 N.E.2d 848, 852-55 (1979); Harding v.
People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
State, 5 Md. App. 230, 235-47, 246 A.2d 302, 306-12 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949
(1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-22, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978); note 6 supra
and accompanying text.
20. See notes 21-38 infia and accompanying text.
21. See notes 22-23 infta and accompanying text.
22. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120-21 (W.D. Va. 1976);
People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 875-78, 366 P.2d 314, 318-20, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898, 902-04
(1961); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903, 904 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cerl. denied, 336 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 1976); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 727-31, 273 N.W.2d 539, 54345 (1978); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); State v. Pierce,
263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1974); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710,
715-16, 204 S.E.2d 414, 418-19 (1974).
23. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198-99 (9th Cir.) (witness to robbery and murder allowed to testify after memory refreshed by hypnosis), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1006 (1978); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 280-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977)
(witness allowed to testify after hypnotized by FBI during investigation of crime); State v.
La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980) (testimony of witness whose
memory was refreshed through hypnosis not admissible); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136,
137-38, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1974) (testimony of witness hypnotized during criminal
investigation not tainted by hypnosis, testimony admissible); Emmett v. State, 232 Ga.
110, 114-15, 205 S.E.2d 231, 234-35 (1974) (defendant not prejudiced by trial court's refusal to allow cross-examination of state's witness concerning statements made while witness in hypnotic trance); People v. Smrekar, 68 Il.App. 3d 379, 384-88, 385 N.E.2d 848,
852-55 (1979) (testimony of prosecution witness not rendered inadmissible because hypnotized prior to making a positive identification); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 235-47,
246 A.2d 302, 306-12 (1968) (testimony of witness whose recollection of crime restored by
hypnosis held admissible), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96,
119-22, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427-29 (1978) (effect of hypnosis on witness' credibility was for
jury to determine); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 598, 602, 494*P.2d 434, 436 (1972) (prosecution witness allowed to testify after her memory had been refreshed by sodium amytal and
hypnosis); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 8-9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (witness allowed
to testify after amnesia was alleviated by hypnosis).
24. See, e.g., Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113, 1120-21 (W.D. Va. 1976)
(upheld refusal to allow defendant to testify about defendant's statements under hypnosis); People v. Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 875-78, 355 P.2d 314, 318-20, 15 Cal. Rptr. 898, 90204 (1961) (doctor's testimony regarding defendant's statements under hypnosis excluded
because reliability of hypnosis not established); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So. 2d 903, 904
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (defendant's exculpatory statements made while hypnotized properly
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cally-induced testimony of prosecution witnesses, but often with the requirement that the facts adduced while under hypnosis be
25
corroborated.
Several of the jurisdictions admitting hypnotically-induced testimony
have expressed reservations about the use of hypnosis.2 6 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States v. Adams,27 expressed the concern
"that the investigatory use of hypnosis on persons who may later be
excluded because no evidence of scientific reliability of hypnosis), cert. denied, 336 So. 2d
1184 (Fla. 1976); People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 727-31, 273 N.W.2d 539, 54345 (1978) (hypnotically-induced testimony of defendant disallowed because failure to establish scientific reliability of hypnosis); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316, 1326-27 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1975) (expert witness not permitted to testify concerning defendant's exculpatory statements because hypnosis scientifically unreliable).
One court has stated "[i]t was well within the trial court's discretion to determine that
the dubious value. . . [hypnotically-induced testimony] might have in clarifying and supporting defendant's theory of memory restoration would be outweighed by the chance of
misinterpretation and misuse by the jury." People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 729,
273 N.W.2d 539, 544 (1978).
In 1961, the California Supreme Court came to a similar conclusion in People v.
Busch, 56 Cal. 2d 868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961). The supreme court found
that an expert's opinion, based in part on a hypnotic examination, was not admissible
when neither the reliability of hypnosis nor the qualifications of the witness were established by the record. See id. at 878, 366 P.2d at 319-20, 16 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04. The Busch
case subsequently was construed by the California Supreme Court in People v. Modesto,
59 Cal. 2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963), ovemiled in part on other grounds,
People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 388 P.2d 33, 35 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1964). The Modesto court
ruled that Busch did not exclude evidence of a doctor's opinion based on hypnosis when
the witness was qualified as 2n expert psychiatrist and noted that nothing in Busch prevented the introduction of all the data on which the doctor based her opinion. See id. at
733, 382 P.2d at 39-40, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32. The court indicated that the lower court
had erred by relying on Busch to exclude such evidence and failing to exercise its discretion
in determining whether a recording of the hypnotic procedure should have been admitted.
Set id.
Recently, California went one step further and held that it was not improper to allow
post-hypnotic testimony into evidence. See People v. Diggs, - Cal. App. 3d -, -, 169
Cal. Rptr. 386, 391 (1980). The court indicated that such evidence is admissible if the
proponent establishes (1) the reliability of the technique, (2) that the witness furnishing
the testimony has the proper qualifications as an expert to give an opinion on the subject,
and (3) that in the instant case the correct scientific procedures were used. Id. at -, 169
Cal. Rptr. at 391.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.) (memory refreshed
by hypnosis affects credibility not admissibility; care must be exercised to ensure memory
is witness' own recollection), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978); United States v. Narciso,
446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (court allowed witness to testify following
hypnosis where testimony was corroborated by other evidence); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill.
App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979) (corroboration of facts adduced under hypnosis was one factor looked to in allowing previously hypnotized witness to testify); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (1968) (victim's testimony refreshed
by hypnosis held admissible on several grounds including corroborated facts), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 949 (1969).
26. See notes 27-30 inkfa and accompanying text.
27. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978).
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called upon to testify in court carries a dangerous potential for abuse." 28
The court indicated that "[g]reat care must be exercised to insure that
statements after hypnosis are the product of the subject's own recollections, rather than of recall tainted by suggestions received while under
hypnosis." 29 Several jurisdictions have established or recommended safe30
guards to prevent this abuse.
28. See 581 F.2d at 198. In this case, the defense objected to the prosecution's impeachment of a witness, who had been previously hypnotized, by the use of a statement
made by the witness following hypnosis. See id.
29. See id. at 198-99 (footnotes omitted). Although the court did allow the post-hypnotic testimony with an attendant cautionary note, it expressed disapproval of the hypnosis methods used because it was not clear who was present, what questions were asked, and
what the witness' responses were during the hypnotic session. See id. at 199 & n. 12.
30. See, e.g., id. at 199 n.12; People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d
848, 855 (1979); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 428
(1978); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 30, 207 S.E.2d 414, 418 (1974); State v. White, No. J3665 (Wis. 2d Cir. Ct. Mar. 27, 1979).
The court in White concluded that as a matter of law the hypnotic session was unduly
suggestive and adopted the following safeguards or requirements, which were not met by
the defendant in that case:
1. That the hypnotist be a mental health person with special training in the use of hypnosis, preferably a psychiatrist or psychologist;
2. that this person not be informed about the case verbally, but only in a writing that
outlines the necessary facts and is subject to scrutiny;
3. that the hypnotist be independent and not responsible .to the parties;
4. that all contact between the hypnotist and the subject be videotaped from the beginning to the end;
5. that nobody representing either party be present with the hypnotist and the subject
during the hypnotic session;
6. that prior to the session the hypnotist examine the subject to exclude the possibility of
physical or mental illness and to establish that the person has sufficient intelligence,
judgment, and comprehension of what is happening;
7. that the hypnotist elicit all facts from the subject prior to the hypnosis;
8. that during the session, the hypnotist strive to avoid adding any new elements to the
subject's recollection, including any explicit or implicit cues, before, during, or after
the session;
9. that corroboration be sought for any information elicited during the session. Id., slip
op. at 11-12.
Another court has stated:
We think that, at a minimum, complete stenographic records of interviews of
hypnotized persons who later testify should be maintained. Only if the judge,
jury, and the opponent know who was present, questions that were asked, and
the witness's responses can the matter be dealt with effectively. An audio or
video recording of the interview would be helpful.
United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 n.12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978).
In an effort to prevent the potential abuse of hypnosis, the complainant in Mack
proposed a two-prong test to negate the possibility of the hypnotized subject adopting "a
'memory' solely due to suggestion rather than due to recall." See Respondent's Brief at 39.
The complainant felt the true question before the court was "what standard must be
applied to find whether the hypnotically-elicited recall is derived from the witness' actual
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Courts admitting hypnotically-induced testimony reject the assertion
that testimony by a previously hypnotized person is inherently unreliable. 3 1 Instead, these jurisdictions hold that the use of hypnosis bears only
on the credibility of the testimony.32 The testimony, therefore, is admisexperience versus being the product of improper suggestion, deliberate falsehood, innocent
confabulation or a desire to please the hypnotist." Se id. at 38.
The first prong was based on the standard for suppresion set forth in Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1960). Set Respondent's Brief at 39. In Simmons, the Court
stated in regard to photographic identification that such evidence should be suppressed
"only if the procedure was so impermissably suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification." See 390 U.S. at 384. The standard, when
applied to a case involving hypnotically-induced testimony, is intended to resolve the
problem of undue suggestion during hypnosis. See Respondent's Brief at 39. The complainant asserted that hypnotically-induced recall could be tested through cross-examination, the same as an ordinary recall may be tested through cross-examination, for the
purpose of determining whether the Sinmons standard should apply. See id. at 40.
The second prong proposed by the complainant was the independent corroboration
of facts retrieved through hypnosis. See id. at 41-42. Under this test, the corroborated
facts must have been unknown or unavailable to both the investigating authorities and the
hypnotist prior to the hypnotic session. See id. Two of the experts in the case indicated
that independent verification of the facts could provide a basis for concluding that the
subject was "remembering." See id. at 43. The complainant asserted that "[b]ecause...
[other jurisdictions allowing such testimony] paid considerable attention to factual corroboration, and because the five experts who testified herein paid considerable attention to
corroboration, it appears to be a reasonable and feasible standard by which to guard
against 'memories' that are without a basis in fact." Id. at 42.
The Simmons standard was adopted in another case involving circumstances very similar to the Mack case. See United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281-82 (E.D. Mich.
1977) (court applied Sinmons standard to question of suggestibility during hypnotic session
and subsequent interviews). The Narciso court recognized the possibility of misidentification through the use of hypnotic interrogation sessions but held that it did not rise to the
level of a "very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" that triggered exclusion of the evidence under Simmons. See id. at 281-82.
Other jurisdictions have adopted safeguards similar to the corroboration prong proposed by the complainant. See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 I11.App. 3d 379, 388, 385
N.E.2d 848, 855 (1979) ("identification was corroborated by other substantial evidence
unknown to the witness at the time she made the positive identification of the defendant"); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 247, 246 A.2d 302, 312 (1968) ("there was sufficient corroboration of the [previously hypnotized] witness' testimony."), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 122, 244 S.E.2d 414, 428 (1978) ("Corroborating circumstances developed through the testimony of other witnesses include the
obvious falsity of the defendant's purported alibi testimony.').
31. See, e.g., People v. Smrekar, 68 I11.App. 3d 379, 385, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979);
State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (defendant's objections to
hypnotically-induced testimony go to weight rather than admissibility of evidence).
In Smrekar, the court stated that
when a [previously hypnotized] witness is capable of giving testimony having
some probative value, the witness is permitted to testify with evidence of impairment of the ability of the witness to accurately recall evidence or that suggestive
material has been used to refresh the witness' recollection going only to the
weight to be given to the testimony of the witness ....
68 Ill. App. 3d at 385, 385 N.E.2d at 853 (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978) (that
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sible and the weight to be given to it is for the trier of fact to determine.33
Other jurisdictions hold that hypnotic evidence is inherently unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible. 34 The Illinois court, in People v.
Harper,3 5 declined to equate truth serum with hypnosis as memory retrieval devices, noting "that the scientific reliability of neither is sufficient
to justify the use of test results of either in the serious business of criminal
prosecution." 3 6 In Greenfield v. Commonwealth,37 the Virginia Supreme
Court refused to allow an expert to testify regarding the defendant's exculpatory statements, made while under hypnosis, on the ground that
38
most experts would agree that hypnosis is unreliable.
witness was hypnotized bears upon credibility); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 9, 492
P.2d 312, 315 (1971) (that witness was hypnotized bears upon weight to be given testimony); note 43 infta. In McQueen, the court stated:
The fact that the memory of a witness concerning events, distant in time, has
been refreshed, prior to trial, as by the reading of documents or by conversation
with another, does not render the witness incompetent to testify concerning his
or her present recollection. The credibility of such testimony, in view of prior
uncertainty on the part of the witness, is a matter for the jury's consideration. So
it is when the witness has, in the meantime, undergone some psychiatric or other
medical treatment by which memory is said to have been refreshed or restored.
So it is when the intervening experience has been hypnosis.
1d. at 119, 244 S.E.2d at 427-28.
33. See People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979) (use of
hypnosis to refresh witness' recollection goes "only to the weight to be given to the testimony of the witness"); Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 236, 246 A.2d 302, 306 (1968)
(that witness received her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns question of
weight of evidence), cert. detid, 395 U.S. 949 (1969); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119,
244 S.E.2d 414, 427 (1978) (jury advised that witness was hypnotized; credibility of witness was for jury to determine). But see United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 670-71
(9th Cir.) (held that court abused discretion' by allowing expert to testify regarding effect
of hypnosis on witness when use of hypnosis was not disputed), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885
(1979); People v. Kester, 78 Ill. App. 3d 902, 909, 397 N.E.2d 888, 894 (1979) (held that
testimony of expert concerning witness' statements while under hypnosis were inadmissible).
34. See State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980) (state of
science of hypnosis has not been shown to be such so as to allow hypnotically-induced
testimony); note 24 supra.
35. 111 111. App. 2d 204, 250 N.E.2d 5 (1969) (victim of sexual assault voluntarily
submitted to hypnosis and treatment with sodium amobarbital in effort to recall assailant).

36. See id. at 209, 250 N.E.2d at 7. Although the victim underwent a hypnotic examination, it did not produce any information; the contested identification was made after use
of the "truth serum." See id. at 206, 250 N.E.2d at 6.
37. 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
38. See id. at 715, 204 S.E.2d at 419 ("Most experts agree that hypnotic evidence is
unreliable because a person under hypnosis can manufacture or invent false statements.").
In a companion case involving the same defendant and arising out of the same fact
situation as in Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974), a federal
district court also applied a reliability test. See Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113
(W.D. Va. 1976). The Robinson case was a habeas corpus action brought by the defendant,
Greenfield, after his conviction in state court was affirmed. The Robinson court ruled that
the state court was correct in refusing to permit defendant to testify while in a hypnotic
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The Minnesota court adopted a similar approach in Mack.39 The
court applied a standard of admissibility that addressed the reliability of
hypnosis in reviving an accurate memory. 40 Competency, not credibility, was therefore the pivotal issue. 4 t The standard applied by the Mack
court was first articulated in Fye v. UnitedStates.42 The Foe test requires
a consensus within the scientific community regarding the reliability of
the scientific device before it or its results are admissible. 43 The Minnesota Supreme Court first adopted the Fge standard to exclude the results
of a polygraph test in State v. Kolander.44
trance or to allow defendant's expert witness to testify about defendant's statements made
while under hypnosis because there was "no reason to suggest that the excluded evidence
. . .[was] reliable. Indeed the very reason for excluding hypnotic evidence is due to its
potential unreliability." Id. at 1120 (citations omitted).
39. See notes 40-43 infa and accompanying text.
40. See 292 N.W.2d at 768.
41. See id. at 768-69 ("fact that a witness' memory results from hypnosis bears on the
question of whether her testimony is sufficiently competent . . . to merit admission at
all").
42. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
Foe dealt with whether the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, a forerunner of the modern day "polygraph," were admissible. Holding that the device had not
gained sufficient standing and scientific recognition among the scientific community, the
court established the following principle: "While courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." Id. at 1014.
In Mack, defendant proposed the use of a Fqie-type standard. See Petitioner's Brief at
9-I1. The defendant proposed a three-pronged test to determine the admissibility of evidence based upon the application of a new scientific technique. See id.at 11. The test was
as follows: first, the reliability of the method must be established; second, the witness must
be properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion; and, third, the correct scientific
procedures must have been used in the matter at hand. See id.
One jurisdiction has implicitly rejected the Fqe test. In State v. McQueen, 295 N.C.
96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978), the defense argued that hypnosis was inadmissible based upon
an earlier decision of the court that held lie detector tests inadmissible. See id. at 121, 244
S.E.2d at 429. The court rejected this argument stating:
That is an entirely different question from the one with which we are here confronted. There, the purpose of the proposed evidence was to invade the province
of the jury with evidence designed to show the credibility or lack of credibility of
other testimony. This Court concluded that the accuracy of the results attained
by the use of such scientific device had not been sufficiently established to justify
its use for that purpose. Here, we are concerned with the admissibility of testimony which the witness says is her present recollection of events which she saw
and heard, the credibility of her testimony being left for the jury's appraisal.
Id. at 121-22, 244 S.E.2d at 429.
43. See State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980). "Under the Fqie rule, the
results of mechanical or scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved to the point where experts in the field widely share the view that the
results are scientifically reliable as accurate." Id.
44. See 236 Minn. 209, 220-21, 52 N.W.2d 458, 464 (1952). The court noted the value
of a lie detector as an investigative tool but found that the lie detector "has not yet attained such scientific and psychological accuracy . . .to justify submission thereof to a
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Applying the Fe standard, the Mack court concluded that testimony
adduced while the individual was under hypnosis was not sufficiently
reliable to meet this standard of admissibility.45 Of particular concern to
the court was the highly suggestive state into which a hypnotized person
is induced and the likelihood that the testimony is, therefore, unreliable.46 The court also was concerned that hypnosis may result in confabjury as evidence of the guilt or innocence of a person accused of a crime." Id. at 221-22, 52
N.W.2d at 465.
Since Kolandr, the Minnesota Supreme Court has continued to apply the Fye standard to polygraph tests as well as to other scientific devices or techniques. See, e.g., State v.
Wakefield, 263 N.W.2d 76, 77 (Minn. 1978) (polygraph inadmissible), noted in 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 455 (1980); State v. Hill, 312 Minn. 514, 525, 253 N.W.2d 378, 385
(1977) (per curiam) (polygraph inadmissible); State v. Goblirsch, 309 Minn. 401, 407, 246
N.W.2d 12, 15 (1976) (polygraph inadmissible); State v. Gerdes, 291 Minn. 353, 359, 191
N.W.2d 428, 432 (1971) (results of radar in speeding cases may be admissible); State v.
Quinn, 289 Minn. 184, 187, 182 N.W.2d 843, 845 (1971) (results of breathalizer test held
admissible).
One jurisdiction has held that polygraph test results are admissible in limited circumstances in a criminal proceeding. See State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 184, 184-85, 539 P.2d 204,
204-05 (1975). In Dorsey, the court held that a polygraph's results were admissible under
the following circumstances: 1) the test is stipulated to by both parties; 2) no objection to
admissibility is offered at trial; 3) the polygraph operator is an expert; 4) there is testimony
of authorities in the field on the reliability of the testing procedures; and 5) the validity of
the tests made on the subject is established. See id.
45. See 292 N.W.2d at 768. The Mack court stated:
Although hypnotically-adduced "memory" is not strictly analogous to the results
of mechanical testing, we are persuaded that the Fye rule is equally applicable
in this context, where the best expert testimony indicates that no expert can
determine whether memory retrieved by hypnosis, or any part of that memory, is
truth, falsehood, or confabulation-a filling of gaps with fantasy. Such results
are not scientifically reliable as accurate.
id.
For a general discussion of the experts' testimony in this case, see Petitioner's Brief at
A-I- I to -V-33 (contains excerpts of testimony of five experts in this case).
The case with a fact situation most similar to Aack is Harding v. State, 5 Md. App.
230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 949 (1969), which involved a young woman
who was the victim of a rape and assault but could not recall the identity of her assailant
until she was put under hypnosis. The Harding court held that even though the victimwitness told different stories before and after the hypnosis, the discrepancy concerned a
"question of the weight of the evidence which the trier of [fact] . . . must decide." Id. at
236, 246 A.2d at 306.
A criticism of the conclusion reached in Harding is that it "appears that the court may
have fallen into the major trap to which the authorities call attention: the fact that because the victim appeared to be both conv'ncing and convtnced of the accuracy of her story,
the court also became convinced." Dillof, The Admissibility ofHypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 1, 20 (1977) (emphasis in original). By its ruling, the Mack
court avoided the pitfall of being convinced of the hypnotically-induced testimony merely
because the subject was convinced.
The court rejected as "artificial and unprincipled" any distinction between hypnotically-induced testimony offered by the defense to exculpate and that offered by the prosecution to prove its case. See 292 N.W.2d at 771.
46. See 292 N.W.2d at 768-69. The court also noted that "the historical or scientific
accuracy of the memory adduced under hypnosis is not an ordinary subject of investiga-

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol7/iss1/15

12

et al.: Criminal Law—Hypnotically-Induced Testimony Held Inadmissable in
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

ulation or deliberate fabrication because of the subject's desire to please
the hypnotist. 47 The court further believed that a hypnotized subject is
tion or concern by its practitioners in the medical and psychological community." Id. at
768.
47. See id. In Mack, the court observed:
The hypnotized subject is influenced by a need to "fill gaps." When asked a
question under hypnosis, rarely will he or she respond, "I don't know." Another
factor . . which can affect the "memory" produced under hypnosis is the subject's desire to please either the hypnotist or others who have asked the person
hypnotized to remember and who have urged that it is important that he or she
remember certain events.
Id.
There is some evidence to indicate that a hypnotized person is capable of being intentionally deceitful under hypnosis if sufficiently motivated. "The subject may feign induction into the hypnotic state, a truly hypnotized, cooperative subject may commingle
fantasy with fact, and the truly hypnotized subject may deliberately dissemble where his
interests dictate that such is the most propitious course of action." Spector & Foster, supra
note 18, at 577.
One commentator has noted:
Hypnosis has several dangers when it is used to find truth or to assist in refreshing the memory of a witness. There are pitfalls involving the hypnotized
subject. A subject may lie, confabulate, suffer memory distortions or alterations
in varying degrees or even fake being in a hypnotic trance. There are dangers
associated with the hypnotist. The hypnotist may be predisposed toward a certain result; he may overtly or subconsciously coerce or influence the subject to
give desired answers; he may ask the subject leading questions; or the techniques
used by the hypnotist may simply be unreliable. In addition, the physical surroundings and conditions under which the hypnosis was performed may also
influence the result.
Dilloff, supra note 45, at 4 (footnote omitted).
In the court's view the facts in Mack were suspect and may have been the primary
reason for the expanded application of the Fe standard, which has traditionally been
reserved for scientific devices. The court stated:
The circumstances presented by the case before us are most suspect. Hypnosis
of Ms. Erickson was not necessary to assist the prosecution in identifying the
defendant, who was the only person in the motel room with her when she was
injured. Beauford Kleidon, the hypnotist, has no formal education and no scientific understanding of the human memory or of the operation of suggestion in
hypnosis. Furthermore, he was hired by the police, whose interest in the outcome of the hypnotic session might well have been communicated to Ms. Erickson. These interested parties, but no representative of the defendant, were, in
fact, present at the hypnotic session, possibly cuing Ms. Erickson's memory by
their facial expressions and gestures. The hypnotic session itself took place several weeks after the incident which Ms. Erickson sought to recall, during which
time she undoubtedly spoke to the physicians who treated her and entertained
their own hypotheses regarding the origins of the injury, as well as to the police
and her friends.
292 N.W.2d at 772.
Even if the court adopted the two-prong test proposed by the complainant, see note
30 supra, it is unlikely that the second prong would have been met in the instant case. The
Mack court indicated that the facts recalled by the complainant while under hypnosis
were not corroborated. See 292 N.W.2d at 772 (complainant stated she ate pizza at Embers, which does not serve pizza; stated defendant's motorcycle was black when it was
actually maroon; stated she had met defendant prior to incident but facts indicated otherwise).
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prone to be absolutely convinced of the truth of what is recalled under
hypnosis. 48 As a result, "[i]t would be impossible to cross-examine such a
49
witness in any meaningful way."
The scope of the Fye standard was significantly broadened by the
Mack court's application of it to hypnotically-induced testimony.50 Traditionally, this test has been applied to mechanical devices such as the
polygraph, breathalyzer, and radar.5 ' Hypnosis, however, is not a
mechanical device that attempts to serve a truth-determinative function.52 Rather, it is a method used to restore the memory of an event
that has been forgotten or psychologically suppressed.5 3 Neither hypnotically-induced memory nor ordinary memory produce a totally accurate
recollection of a particular event observed by a witness.54 Yet, despite
the unreliability of ordinary memory, a witness is allowed to testify regarding an observed event, subject to the attendant safeguards of a court
proceeding. 55 The use of hypnosis, therefore, should affect the credibility
48. See 292 N.W.2d at 769. "[A] 'memory' produced under hypnosis becomes hardened in the subject's mind. A witness [following hypnosis] becomes convinced of the absolute truth of the account he made while under hypnosis." Id.
49. Id. See also note 14 supra.
50. See notes 43-44 supra.
51. See note 44 supra.
52. Set Spector & Foster, supra note 18, at 584. "Unfortunately, hypnosis has become
linked in the minds of courts and commentators with the polygraph and narcoanalysis as a
technique for mechanically ascertaining the truth of the witness' testimony." Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Mack court did indicate, however, that hypnosis was not strictly analogous to
mechanical testimony. See 292 N.W.2d at 768.
53. See People v. Smrekar, 68 I11.App. 3d 379, 385-86, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979)
("[H]ypnosis has become established as a valuable tool in the hands of the skilled practitioner and can be used to restore the memory of experiences which have been repressed
due to their unpleasant or painful nature."); Spector & Foster, supra note 18, at 584
("value of hypnosis lies in its scientifically-established reliability as a device for retrieving
relevant testimony previously forgotten or psychologically suppressed").
54. Compare Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PrtrialHypnosis on a P1rospective
Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313, 314 (1980) (memory of witness who has been hypnotized
is so contaminated that he is, in effect, rendered incompetent to testify) with Buckhout,
Eyewitness Testimony, SCIENTIFIc AMERICAN, Dec. 1974, at 23 (research and courtroom
experience indicate that witness is not capable of accurately recalling events previously
witnessed), reprintedin 15 JURIMETRICS J. 171, 171 (1975) and Loftus, Reconstrcting Memoy."
The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOLAOGY TODAY, Dec. 1974, at 117 (eyewitness testimony is
often inaccurate and results in wrong person being convicted), repnntedhn 15 JURIMETRICS
J. 188, 189 (1975).
55. See Spector & Foster, supra note 18, at 584 (eyewitness testimony, although unreliable, "is routinely admitted for jurors' consideration because it is insulated to some degree
. . . by the enforcement of procedural safeguards, such as opportunity for cross-examination').
Courts have traditionally been liberal regarding the manner in which a witness'
memory may be refreshed. See Note, Refteshing the Memory of a Witness Through Hypnosis, 5
U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REV. 266, 267 (1976). The Minnesota court has allowed a variety of
methods to be used to refresh a witness' memory. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242
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of the hypnotically-induced testimony and not its admissibility.56
Although the Mack court resolutely states that hypnotically-induced
testimony is not admissible in a criminal proceeding, the court did not
foreclose "the use of hypnosis as an extremely useful investigative tool
when a witness is enabled to remember verifiable factual information
which provides new leads to the solution of a crime."57 The court did,
however, recognize the potential for abuse inherent in the investigative
use of hypnosis. The Mack court suggested that safeguards be established
"to assure the utmost freedom from suggestion upon the hypnotized person's memory recall in the event he or she must later be called to testify
to recollections recorded before the hypnotic interview."58 In a footnote,
Minn. 265, 273-74, 65 N.W.2d 185, 191 (1954) (memo prepared from payroll records of
employer used to refresh memory); State v. Raasch, 201 Minn. 158, 161, 275 N.W. 620,
621 (1937) (use of transcript of recording permitted to help witness refresh memory of
recording); Draxten v. Brown, 197 Minn. 511, 514, 267 N.W. 498, 499-500 (1936) (doctor
permitted to refresh memory from nurses' notes).
This liberal attitude toward allowing the witness to refresh his memory is predicated
on various safeguards that exist to prevent abuse or unreliable use of the memory refreshing device. See Note, supra, at 268-69.
One court has stated that any method that refreshes a memory should be allowed.
See Jewett v. United States, 15 F.2d 955, 956 (9th Cir. 1926). The court stated:
[I]t is quite immaterial by what means the memory is quickened; it may be a
song, or a face, or a newspaper item, or a writing of some character. It is sufficient that by some mental operation, however mysterious, the memory is stimulated to recall the event, for when so set in motion it functions quite
independently of the actuating cause.
Id; accord, United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 281 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (allowing
prosecution witness to testify to events in case as he recalled them under hypnosis). The
court in Narciso indicated that "[t]he hypnosis enabled him to gradually begin to recapture fragments of his memory in a way that led him to believe--as a part of a necessary
human personality defense mechanism-that he had never forgotten anything at all." Id.
(footnote omitted).
56. Cf. Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam)
(although memory of witness was refreshed by hypnosis for civil case, "in legal effect her
situation is not different from that of a witness who claims that his recollection of an event
that he could not earlier remember was revived when he thereafter read a particular document").
For a discussion of those courts that have held that the fact that a witness has been
hypnotized affects the credibility and not the admissibility of this testimony in a criminal
proceeding, see notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
The safeguards proposed by the complainant could be applied to determine the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony because they attempt to ensure first, that
memory adduced under hypnosis is not the product of suggestion and second, that the
recall is accurate and not confabulation. See Respondent's Brief at 39-45.
57. 292 N.W. at 771. "A witness under hypnosis may, for instance, bring forth information previously unknown to law enforcement authorities . . . which subsequently aids
police in identification of a suspect." ld.
The Arizona court, although refusing to admit hypnotically-induced testimony also
deemed hypnosis to be a useful investigative tool. See State v. La Mountain, 125 Ariz.
547, 551, 611 P.2d 551, 555 (1980).
58. 292 N.W.2d at 771 (footnote omitted).
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the court noted but did not adopt these safeguards:5 9 1) hypnosis should
be performed by a trained psychiatrist or psychologist who has no previous knowledge of the investigation or any bias in the case; 2) all contact
between the hypnotist and the subject should be video-taped; 3) no one
but the hypnotist and the subject should be present before and during
the hypnotic session; and 4) tape recordings should be made of any interrogations of the witness prior to the hypnotic session.60
By noting, but not adopting these safeguards, the Mack court failed to
answer the crucial question of what standards investigative agencies and
attorneys must adhere to when using hypnosis as an investigative de59. See id. at n. 14. The safeguards were proposed by Dr. Orne, one of the experts in
the case. See id. Dr. Orne, who is a licensed psychiatrist and a chemical psychologist,
heads the major hypnosis research laboratory in the country, where he conducts research
experiments on hypnosis. See Respondent's Brief at 15-16 n.l. "He has served as a consultant to a variety of governmental agencies on the subject of hypnosis, and has testified
widely on the subject. His publications in the area of hypnosis are numerous." Id.
60. See id. at 771-72 n.14. The safeguards suggested were:
A. Hypnosis should be carried out by a psychiatrist or psychologist with
special training in its use. He should not be informed about the facts of the case
verbally; rather, he should receive a written memorandum outlining whatever
facts he is to know, carefully avoiding any other communications which might
affect his opinion. Thus, his beliefs and possible bias can be evaluated. It is
extremely undesirable to have the individual conducting the hypnotic sessions to
have any involvement in the investigation of the case. Further he should be an
independent professional not responsible to the prosecution or the investigators.
B. All contact of the psychiatrist with the individual to be hypnotized
should be video taped from the moment they meet until the entire interaction is
completed. The casual comments which are passed before or after hypnosis are
every bit as important to get on tape as the hypnotic session itself. (It is possible
to give suggestions prior to the induction of hypnosis which will act as posthypnotic suggestions.)
Prior to the induction of hypnosis, a brief evaluation of the patient should
be carried out and the psychiatrist should then elicit a detailed description of the
facts as the witness or victim remembers them. This is important because individuals often are able to recall a good deal more while talking to a psychiatrist
than when they are with an investigator, and it is important to have a record of
what the witness's beliefs are before hypnosis. Only after this has been completed should the hypnotic session be initiated. The psychiatrist should strive to
avoid adding any new elements to the witness's description of his experiences,
including those which he had discussed in his wake state, lest he inadvertently
alter the nature of the witness's memories--or constrain them by reminding him
of his waking memories.
C. No [one] other than the psychiatrist and the individual to be hypnotized should be present in the room before and during the hypnotic session. This
is important because it is all too easy for observers to inadvertently communicate
to the subject what they expect, what they are startled by, or what they are
disappointed by. If either the prosecution or the defense wish to observe the
hypnotic session, they may do so without jeopardizing the integrity of the session
through a one-way screen or on a television monitor.
D. Because the interactions which have preceded the hypnotic session may
well have a profound effect on the sessions themselves, tape recordings of prior
interrogations are important to document that a witness had not been implicitly
or explicitly cued pertaining to certain information which might then be reported for apparently the first time by the witness during hypnosis.
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vice.61 The practical use of hypnosis as an investigatory device is, therefore, uncertain. If the use of hypnosis is permissible for investigative
purposes, and memory adduced from the hypnotic session leads to verifiable factual information that is admissible, then that acquired memory
should be admissible because its reliability is established.62 It is important that all material facts concerning a particular incident are before
the trier of fact. Although there certainly will be situations in which it
will be difficult to separate independently corroborated facts from the
witness' memory following hypnosis, 63 this does not justify a blanket pro-

hibition on the use of hypnotically-induced testimony in a criminal proceeding.
The decision in Mack presupposes the scientific unreliability of hypnosis. This presupposition is based on medical testimony that points out
the difficulty in separating fact from fiction in a "memory" restored by
hypnosis. The Minnesota Supreme Court's application of the Fqe scientific reliability test indicates that hypnosis may, in the future, achieve the
requisite legal credibility. If hypnosis attains general acceptance in the
61. An additional question left unanswered by the court is whether hypnotically-induced testimony is admissible in a civil proceeding.
One jurisdiction has held that hypnotically-induced testimony is admissible in a civil
proceeding. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974).
These decisions have held such testimony admissible as present recollection refreshed.
The Mack court, however, rejected this premise, at least in the setting of a criminal prosecution. See 292 N.W.2d at 768-70. Therefore this question will have to be answered in a
future decision.
62. Corroboration is one of the tests used by some of the courts that have admitted
hypnotically-induced testimony. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
If the hypnotic recall is corroborated by facts unknown prior to the hypnotic session,
that would appear to be a strong indication that the particular procedure was reliable and
would alleviate one of the Mack court's concerns regarding the use of hypnosis.
Additionally, there may be a constitutional problem in denying the admission of hypnotically-induced testimony. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the
Supreme Court found that the defendant's right to due process had been violated when he
was prevented from calling as a witness, a person who had heard the confession of another
man for the crime for which the defendant was on trial. See 410 U.S. at 302.
One commentator perceived the Chambers decision as suggesting that:
When a criminal defendant possesses reliable information that is crucial to his
case, due process may require that he be given the right to present this testimony, despite a contrary rule of evidence. It is not difficult to see that there
could be situations where either the defendant or a crucial defense witness is
suffering amnesia regarding the events leading up to the crime. If hypnosis helps
to remove the block, the defendant or the witness may remember things crucial
to the defense. . . . Hypnosis may enable the defendant to recreate the event
and in the process provide information leading to his acquittal and the possible
arrest of the actual perpetrator.
Spector & Foster, supra note 18, at 610-11.
63. See Emmett v. State, 232 Ga. 110, 115, 205 S.E.2d 231, 235 (1974). Referring to a
previously hypnotized witness, the court indicated that "[s]he was cross examined extensively and thoroughly. It does not appear which details she may have remembered after
her hypnotic sessions." Id.
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medical community as a reliable memory-refreshing device, the Foe
standard may be met, signifying that hypnotically-induced testimony
will be held admissible in Minnesota.
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